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+XEQHU¶V DQG :KLWH¶V thought-provoking scenario rests on a unified conception of 
psychopathy, a reliance upon subjective suffering and individual medical benefit as 
grounds to justify ethical treatment/research participation, and an assertion that, as 
psychopathic prisoners do not experience individual suffering which they attribute to 
psychopathy, they are by definition unable to provide valid informed consent to 
research trial participation/treatment for psychopathy involving DBS. 
 
The authors derive their unified conception of psychopathy from classic sources 
Cleckley and Hare. Yet, as Cleckley and Hare recognised, since some with high levels 
of psychopathic characteristics live in the community without criminal records, or rise 
to high positions in society, essentialist readings of psychopathy as psychopathology 
are problematic (Lilienfeld et al 2015). Unified conceptions often conflate imprisoned 
and communit\ SV\FKRSDWKV¶ FKDUDFWHULVWLFV GHVSLWH UHVHDUFK VXJJHVWLng that these 
are distinguishable E\ LPSULVRQHG SV\FKRSDWKV¶ IUHTXHQW FRQVWHOODWLRQ RI specific 
confounding cognitive and affective dysfunctions, including treatable medical factors 
difficult to disentangle from psychopathy, such as traumatic brain injury, concomitant 
cognitive and affective deficits and impaired emotional regulation (Gau & Raine 
2010). Classic clinical/forensic typologies and diagnostic tools derived from 
imprisoned populations underestimate the prevalence and value of adaptive 
FKDUDFWHULVWLFVLQµVXFFHVVIXO¶SV\FKRSDWKVUHVHDUFKupon whom is relatively new. 
 
Recent models like the Triarchic Psychopathy Measure attribute psychoSDWK\¶V
heterogeneity to differing strengths and combinations of three traits: poor impulse 
control and reactive violence (disinhibition), callous-unemotionality linked with 
instrumental aggression and manipulation (meanness), and fearless-dominance thrill-
seeking (boldness) (Blagov et al 2015). Normative and clinical assumptions may 
skew interpretations of psychopathic traits and attempts to create coherent unified 
frameworks of psychopathic dysfunction. Issues of when traits indicate pathology, 
adaptability or neurodiversity challenge. Diagnoses of psychopaths as possessing 
cold, remorseless and callous traits are reframeable in terms of these traits being 
neurologically-driven hyposensitivity to their own emotions, whereas psychopaths 
with poor impulse control are hypersensitive (Mackenzie & Watts 2012), while 
SV\FKRSDWKV¶ FDSDFLW\ IRU ORQJ-term focused attention could be advantageous, or 
dysfunctional inflexibility based on deficient neural integration (Hamilton et al 2015). 
Given this taxonomic volatility, it is ethically and clinically difficult to justify 
implanting DBS devices in imprisoned psychopaths¶ EUDLQV without precise 
nosological distinctions between expressions of psychopathy, their normative and 
clinical significance and relationship to specific neuromechanisms, and evidence of 
the efficacy of DBS. 
 
TKH DXWKRUV¶ Flaims that DBS could not provide individual medical benefit for 
imprisoned psychopaths, nor could they provide valid consent, rest on the assumption 
that a criterion of individual medical benefit for research involving prisoners as a 
vulnerable group is and will remain universal. Yet regulation governing research on 
prisoners in the USA and UK is attracting increasing criticism as overly protectionist. 
Under the principles of equivalence and equity, European prisoners and non-prisoners 
may participate equally in individually beneficial research, while non-beneficial 
research involving prisoners is permissible where it is possible only with prisoners, 
offers them group benefit and poses no more than minimal risk. If prison 
environments are not inherently coercive, prisoners provided with safeguards and 
protections to minimize vulnerability should be able to provide valid informed 
consent, and to arrive at their own risk/benefit assessments.  
 
Within current US standards, DBS could arguably confer individual medical benefit, 
rendering LPSULVRQHG SV\FKRSDWKV¶ participation in DBS treatment/research trials 
ethical. Imprisoned psychopaths undoubtedly experience subjective suffering derived 
from first order desires resulting in incarceration. Medical benefit need not hinge on 
subjective suffering or upon recognition of oneself as oneself as in need of treatment, 
as in justifications for compulsorily treating the mentally ill, many of whom deny they 
are unwell. The mentally ill without subjective suffering, such as those with mania, 
and other patients with symptomless clinical conditions like high blood pressure, may 
make pragmatic, rational decisions to accept medication to preclude future undesired 
consequences such as compulsory treatment or ill-health. Medical benefit for 
psychopathy as a clinical disorder (Raine 2013) would be justifiable, but DBS 
neuromodulation alone would not result in moral conduct: treating confounding 
conditions and pre and post-DBS counseling would be imperative. DBS could thus 
claim to confer individual medical benefit, on the basis that dysfunctional 
neuroregulatory mechanisms had been normalized, accompanying clinical factors 
associated with imprisoned psychopaths had been treated, and reintegrative therapy 
provided.  
 
Nonetheless, DBS treatment for psychopathy may be implausible, or involve 
unacceptable, uncertain risks. While DBS-associated risks of physiological and 
psychological side-effects will decrease as technology progresses, benefits associated 
with DBS for treating psychopathy are still speculative. Non-intrusive interventions 
may have more merit. Focquaert argues DBS is unsuitable to treat adult psychopaths 
as psychopathy is a neurodevelopmental disorder with marked structural and 
functional abnormalities in targeted areas unlikely to respond to neuromodulation 
(Focquaert 2014). She contends that offering incarcerated psychopaths non-invasive 
neurotechnological treatment is ethically acceptable, provided that prison 
circumstances and the proposed treatment are not wrong in some way, treatment is in 
the best interests of the prisoner and informed consent is obtained, but that sizeable 
potential side-effects and irreversibility of invasive neurotechnologies like DBS 
involve undue coercion in prison environments.  
 
Were significant taxonomic and technological advances reducing the current risk 
profile of DBS as regards precise DBS device placement, side-effects and 
reversibility in place, it could be ethical to treat or recruit psychopathic prisoners as 
participants in a trial to test DBS as a means to treat psychopathy. Yet offering 
prisoners participating in research incentives such as reductions in their current 
sentences would be coercive, invalidating consent, as Hubner and White rightly 
contend. Were uncertainties over risk resolved, however, prisoners¶ GHFLVLRQV to 
participate, reasoning after balancing risks/benefits that post-DBS they are likely to 
avoid future imprisonment, could constitute valid informed choices.  
 Issues remain. 
 
A central question is whether DBS treatment of incarcerated psychopaths aims to 
avoid recidivism by converting imprisoned psychopaths to community/µsuccessful¶ 
psychopaths, or by transforming psychopaths to non-psychopaths. Competing 
taxonomies of psychopathy render each option more or less plausible or practicable. 
Incarcerated psychopaths whose confounding difficulties identified above had been 
treated could perhaps be taught strategies to avoid imprisonment by functioning as 
FRPPXQLW\µVXFFHVVIXO¶ SV\FKRSDWKV rendering DBS otiose and thus unethical. 
Whether this would be a socially desirable outcome is questionable. 
 
Research on successful psychopaths suggests that converting imprisoned to successful 
psychopaths via DBS is implausible. Lilienfeld and colleagueV¶VXUYH\RI typologies 
of µsuccessful¶ psychopaths, defined as those achieving short or long-term 
accomplishments which benefit themselves or society, identifies three models of 
psychopathy and suggests µsuccessful¶ psychopaths possess distinct traits (Lilienfeld 
et al 2015). In the differential-severity model, µsuccessful¶ and unsuccessful 
psychopaths possess identical psychopathic characteristics, which are weaker in the 
µVXFFHVVIXO¶ The moderated expression model associates µsuccessful¶ psychopathy 
with intervening adaptive extraneous factors tempering the expression of 
psychopathy, such as intact executive function, effective parenting or superior 
intelligence. The differential-configuration model defines unsuccessful and 
µsuccessful¶ psychopathy as constituted by amalgams of distinct traits: µsuccessful¶
but not unsuccessful, psychopaths tend to possess boldness, conscientiousness, 
fearless dominance, low disinhibition and resilience. Neuromodulation to de-intensify 
psychopathic characteristics is conceivable, but model one is unsupported by 
research. Evidence favours models two and three, yet DBS produces neither adaptive 
extraneous factors, nor distinct traits.  
 
Nor is DBS is likely to convert imprisoned psychopaths to non-psychopaths via moral 
enhancement.  Morality is neurologically complex, and moral enhancement arguably 
impossible, since morality is essentially contestable. Enhancing empathy is suspect ± 
empathy may underpin, but does not guarantee, moral conduct. Effective torture relies 
upon empathy, while psychopathy may constitute neurodiversity, or a moral learning 
disability precluding caring about right and wrong (Mackenzie & Watts 2012). 
Neuromodulation to increase empathy and amygdala sensitivity to fear would be 
insufficient to eradicate psychopathy without post-treatment counseling to arrive at a 
revised, subjectively acceptable, code of moral conduct. Furthermore, questions of 
autonomy and authentic identity underpinning valid consent are fundamental to 
ethical questions surrounding shaping identities through personality-altering 
interventions like DBS (Mackenzie 2014, 2011a, 2011b). Focquart and Schermer 
argue the consent process for direct interventions to provide moral enhancement, such 
as neuromodulation by DBS, should address the possibility of compromised 
autonomy and identity, and there should be post-intervention counseling to allow the 
participant choice over whether to endorse or reject the changes (Focquaert & 
Schermer 2015).  
 
DBS neuromodulation might conceivably VHUYHWRQRUPDOLVHK\SRVHQVLWLYLW\WRRQH¶V
own emotions associated with psychopathic callous-unemotional traits and meanness. 
Psychopaths could thereby learn to not only to know the difference between right and 
ZURQJEXWWRFDUHDERXWLWUHFRJQL]LQJWKHLURZQDQGWKHUHIRUHRWKHUV¶HPRWLRQVDVD
grounding for moral conduct. In a prison context, however, obtaining valid consent 
from psychopaths for DBS treatment/research participation aimed at achieving this 
would present complex ethical conundrums.  
 
PV\FKRSDWKLF SULVRQHUV¶ Sost-DBS treatment experiences of increased empathy and 
fear, along with remorse, guilt and self-condemnation, would be likely to cause rather 
than alleviate subjective suffering as a lLIHWLPH¶V DIIHFWLYH ODQGVFDSH EHFDPH 
disrupted, with established interpersonal strategies like instrumental aggression and 
dominance defamiliarised. New heightened emotional sensitivities would render  
prison environments significantly more inhospitable and hazardous, altering the 
risk/benefit ratio of DBS treatment significantly. Reintegration into a community 
post-release, difficult enough for most prisoners, would be rendered far more 
challenging for DBS-treated psychopaths with newly normalized sensitivity to their 
own and RWKHUV¶HPRWLRQV 
 
Prison contexts further complicate the central issue of who should decide upon the 
final settings for personality-altering interventions like DBS and what would 
constitute valid informed consent. Neuromodulatory settings on DBS devices would 
need to be adjustable, in effect reversible, and choices over who made the decisions 
over settings, and on what grounds, be addressed before and after intervention as part 
of a continuing consent process (Mackenzie 2014, 2011a, 2011b). Prisoners might 
well prefer lower settings of sensitivity to affective empathy and fear than the norm, 
unless they were provided with effective protections or placed in a social environment 
where these unfamiliar emotions could be experienced safely. How far it would be 
possible or ethical to address these future prospects as part of pre-treatment informed 
consent protocols in a prison context is problematic. How these necessary ongoing 
consent processes cRXOG GRYHWDLO ZLWK SDWLHQWV¶ ULJKW WR UHIXVH WUHDWPHnt, and 
SDUWLFLSDQWV¶ULJKWWRZLWKGUDZIURPUHVHDUFKZRXOGEe particularly ethically fraught. 
 
What place there is for psychopaths and psychopathic traits in society as we would 
wish it to be, and within which frame of reference this should be be decided remain 
difficult questions. 7KH DXWKRUV¶ intriguing paper challenges us to integrate its 
concerns with phenomenological research LQWR SV\FKRSDWKV¶ LQWHUQDO ZRUOGV and 
perspectives from evolutionary and social psychology arguing that psychopathy 
represents an adaptive response to harsh socio-historical circumstances. Moreover, 
moral persuasion in neoliberal contexts should arguably be directed towards 
infrastructures with psychopathic values rather than simply towards individuals 
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